

[REDACTED]

Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500010007-7

26 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Member National Foreign Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : NFIB Review of Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: Prospects for Soviet Interference with US Space Systems

1. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level and is scheduled for NFIB on 28 October.

2. The memorandum examines Soviet antisatellite capabilities and Soviet attitudes and doctrine regarding interference with US space systems. It evaluates the likelihood of Soviet interference with US satellites under certain crisis and conflict situations.

3. This study is more exhaustive and explicit than earlier estimates and contains some new findings. The important conclusions of the study are:

- The likelihood of Soviet interference is very low in peacetime or in a crisis or local conflict situation where the US was not directly involved;
- the likelihood of Soviet interference is low in a local conflict where both US and Soviet forces intervene but have limited or specialized roles;
- the likelihood of Soviet interference is high in the event of imminent or actual large scale, direct engagement of US and Soviet forces in a local conflict outside NATO Europe;

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-- there is a very high likelihood of Soviet interference with US space systems should NATO and Warsaw Pact forces become involved in a Central European conflict;

[REDACTED]

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4. There are two known major substantive disagreements with the present draft. CIA has a reservation on the assessment [REDACTED]

25X1B

[REDACTED]

5. In addition there are several minor issues that may come up during the NFIB meeting. [REDACTED]

25X1B

[REDACTED] The Air Force, while agreeing that both US and Soviets are becoming more dependent on space, would probably contest any judgment that the US is or will be more dependent than the Soviets. Finally, there are two minor unaddressed issues:

[REDACTED]

25X1B

These issues will be addressed by the Working Group on Tuesday, 26 October. We expect to get these issues resolved during the Tuesday meeting.

6. It is recommended that CIA concur in the IIM while maintaining the reservation [REDACTED]

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